Refugee camps at EU external borders, the question of the Union’s responsibility, and the potential of EU public liability law by Ziebritzki, Catharina
Refugee camps at EU external
borders, the question of the Union’s
responsibility, and the potential of EU
public liability law
Catharina Ziebritzki 2020-02-05T09:00:00
‘The EU hotspot approach as implemented in Greece is the single most worrying
fundamental rights issue that we are confronting anywhere in the European Union’.
This quote by the head of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) might
sound drastic. Yet, it is not far-fetched. EU bodies, national institutions, international
organisations including the Council of Europe, and NGOs, have, during the past
four years, continuously documented that the asylum processing centres at the
EU external borders lead to fundamental rights violations on a daily basis. The EU
hotspot administration indeed jeopardises the respect for fundamental rights and the
rule of law as enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
Usually, when something is going wrong, a first step towards improvement is to
ask: who is responsible? And yet, with regard to EU hotspots, this question is still
subject to debate. Responsibilities are effectively blurred by the sheer number
of actors operating in those centres combined with a lack of legal clarity. On the
political level, this leads to responsibility-shifting between the European Commission,
Greece and local municipalities. On the legal level, so far, only Greece as the host
Member State is considered responsible, namely under the ECHR. The considerable
involvement of the Commission and EU agencies—in particular Frontex and the
European Asylum Support Office (EASO)— however suggests to look to EU law and
to examine whether and to what extent the European Union is legally responsible.
It is argued here that EU public liability law—more specifically: an action for
damages against the Union or its agencies Frontex and EASO—has a particular
potential in this context. First, it would help secure the right to an effective remedy
to concerned individuals. Second, it would thereby serve to address systemic
deficiencies in the EU hotspot administration. Third, it could ultimately provide an
answer to the crucial question of whether the Union is responsible for fundamental
rights violations in EU hotspots.
1 – The violation of fundamental rights in EU
hotspots—systemic deficiencies
In 2015, the Commission put forward the EU hotspot approach as part of the
European Agenda on Migration. While the approach is implemented both in Italy
and Greece, this contribution focuses on the latter. Each of the five EU hotspots in
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Greece, located on Aegean islands, consist of a refugee camp, an administrative
complex, and, in some cases, a pre-removal detention facility. In March 2016, with
the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU hotspots were transformed
into return centres meaning that the asylum procedure and the reception conditions
were adapted to the aim of return. Currently, about 41,000 persons are staying in
those camps.
The approach of ‘processing asylum claims at borders, particularly when these
centres are located in relatively remote locations, creates fundamental rights
challenges that appear almost unsurmountable’. This assessment by FRA seems
plausible given the empirical evidence provided by the already four-years long
‘hotspot experiment’. More specifically, FRA finds fundamental rights risks with
regard to, inter alia, Articles 1, 4, 5(3), 6, 7, 18 and 19, 20 and 21, 24, 25 and 26,
41 and 47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (ChFR). Two aspects deserve
particular attention.
First, the reception conditions are far from complying with any standard of EU
secondary law and wholly inadequate for human beings: Shelter is insufficient
(if there is any), there exists exposure to extreme weather conditions, a high risk
of sexual, gender-based and other forms of violence, a lack of medical services
despite widespread physical and severe psychological health issues, insufficient and
inadequate sanitary facilities, and a lack of access to education or social services.
Taken as a whole, the reception conditions arguably amount to a violation of Article
4 ChFR prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatment, at least insofar as vulnerable
persons are concerned. This follows from the standards established by the CJEU
from N.S. to Jawo, taking into account the case law of the ECtHR from M.S.S. to
Tarakhel. Concerning EU hotspots specifically, the ECtHR seems to slowly change
its jurisprudence: In contrast to earlier decisions concerning the situation in March
2016, a violation of Article 3 ECHR was found in more recent interim measures
concerning vulnerable persons. Even if one assumes that a violation of Article 4
ChFR can be found only for vulnerable persons, this still affects a considerable
number of people.
Second, a deportation to Turkey, at least in the vast majority of cases, would be in
breach of the Asylum Procedures Directive, since Turkey cannot be considered as
safe third country or first country of asylum. This is, despite the differing decision of
the Greek Council of State, in line with the view of the Greek administration (and the
Administrative Court of Munich). Considering the situation in Turkey, it seems that,
at least for the vast majority of persons, the deportation would amount to a violation
of the non-refoulement principle as enshrined in Articles 4, 18, 19(2) ChFR. This
follows from the minimum standards established by the ECtHR in Ilias and Ahmad
with regard to Article 3 ECHR. (The CJEU has not yet established the constitutional
standards following from Articles 4, 18, 19(2) ChFR: The decision in Alheto concerns
a specific case, and the decision in LH  remains to be awaited). With regard to the
situation in Turkey specifically, an individual complaint before the ECtHR is pending.
Those two aspects speak in favour of describing the implementation of the EU
hotspot as systemically deficient. Both a breach of Article 4 ChFR as well as breach
of the non-refoulement principle as enshrined in Article 4, 18, 19(2) ChFR meet the
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threshold of being relevant for Article 2 TEU. Further, both breaches are systemic
in the sense of widespread or inherent to the situation: An arguable limitation to the
sub-group of vulnerable persons does not hinder the qualification as systemic. Due
to the design of EU hotspots as return centres, the question whether deportations to
Turkey violate the non-refoulement principle is, despite the relatively low numbers of
returns, of structural relevance.
2 – The considerable involvement of the Union in the
EU hotspot administration
Against this background, it is worthwhile to have a closer look at the involvement
of the Union in the EU hotspot administration. From the perspective of EU
administrative law, the distinctive characteristic of EU hotspots, in comparison to
other asylum processing centres at EU external borders, is the close administrative
cooperation between Union bodies and national authorities. This becomes clear
already from Article 2(23) Frontex Regulation defining a ‘hotspot area’ as an area
‘in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and
participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or
potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase
in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders’.
The EU hotspot administration can hence be described as the paradigm example for
advanced vertical administrative cooperation within the integrated European asylum
administration. This means that several EU agencies—such as Frontex, EASO,
Europol, and Eurojust—cooperate with several national authorities—such as asylum
service, reception service, police, and army. In practice, international organisations
such as UNHCR and IOM, several NGOs, and a private security company operate in
those centres in addition.
The operational level—the role of Frontex and EASO
On the operational level, migration management support teams (MMST) deployed
by the EU agencies support the Greek authorities. The distinctive feature of the
MMST lies, inter alia, in the close inter-agency cooperation. While Frontex supports
in particular by registering applicants and escorting deportations to Turkey, EASO
supports notably by conducting asylum interviews and drafting legal opinions
recommending the acceptance or rejection of the concerned individual’s claim for
international protection.
With a view to EU public liability law, it should be kept in mind that the responsibility
to issue administrative decisions lies with the host Member State. The role of Frontex
and EASO is to provide non-formally binding administrative support. However, the
line between formally-binding and non-formally binding is not that easy to draw: Non-
formally binding administrative conduct can have de facto binding effects on national
authorities, as illustrated by EASO’s involvement in the assessment of asylum
claims. And non-formally binding administrative conduct can have quite significant
- 3 -
effects on individuals, in particular since the reformed Frontex Regulation does not
exclude the use of force by Frontex MMST staff.
The coordination and monitoring level—the role of
the Commission and the EURTF
On the coordination and monitoring level, responsibility lies with the European
Commission, who is supported by Frontex, EASO, and the other relevant EU
agencies in this respect. Article 40(3) Frontex Regulation provides that the
‘Commission, in cooperation with the host Member State and the relevant Union
bodies, offices and agencies (…) shall be responsible for the coordination of the
activities of the migration management support teams.’ The Commission performs
this task within the framework of the EU Regional Task Force (EURTF). The EURTF
is a coordination structure which has been established without a clear legal basis
and operates under non-public ‘terms of cooperation’ and ‘rules of procedure’.
With a view to EU public liability law, it should be noted that the Commission’s
mandate includes the supervisory obligation to ensure that the EU hotspot approach
is implemented in line with EU law. This becomes clear already from Article 40(3)
Frontex Regulation, read in light of its Article 1 and recitals. Further, and more
importantly, this follows from Article 17(1) TEU, as interpreted by the CJEU in Ledra,
as well as from Article 51 ChFR.
3 – The Potential of EU Public Liability Law—
enforcing EU law from below
The Commission, Frontex, and EASO are hence closely involved in the EU hotspot
administration which is systemically deficient, and leads to fundamental rights
violations in individual cases. This gives rise to the crucial question: Can the Union
be held responsible? A legal regime which could provide an answer to this question
would ideally grant the right to an effective remedy to the concerned individual and
enforce the rule of EU law more generally, while at the same time allowing for the
attribution of responsibility among the involved actors.
It is argued here that EU public liability law has a particular potential in this context
due to its subjective and objective legal protection function combined with its
attribution function. More specifically, the particular potential lies in the action
for damages against the Union or its agencies—as codified in Article 340(2)
TFEU respectively Article 97(4), 98 Frontex Regulation, and Article 45(3) EASO
Regulation. In the latter case, the agency would be liable under its founding
Regulation in a first degree, and the Union, since it cannot exclude its liability under
Article 340(2) TFEU by adopting secondary law, in a second degree.
To begin with, it seems that, among the approaches addressing systemic
deficiencies by enforcing EU law, one can distinguish between top-down procedures,
initiated by the Commission as guardian of the treaties, and bottom-up procedures,
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initiated by individuals. Both the preliminary reference procedure, as the standard
mechanism in the internal market, as well as procedures in which individuals claim
their rights directly before the CJEU, as standard mechanism in competition or state
aid law, form part of the latter.
In the case of EU hotspots, any procedure depending on the Commission’s initiative
seems unsuitable to enforce EU law due to the Commission’s involvement in the
EU hotspot administration. The preliminary reference procedure is moreover of little
use already because an action for damages against the Union cannot be brought
before national courts. What remains are the procedures granting the individual
direct access to the CJEU.
The action for damages is the most suitable procedure in this context. Notably,
it could grant the right to an effective remedy, enshrined in Article 47 ChFR, in a
particularly challenging context. The increasingly integrated European administration
more generally raises challenges as to how to guarantee the right to an effective
remedy. In the case of EU hotspots, the challenge arises, inter alia, because the
relevant administrative conduct is of non-formally binding nature and consists in
omissions to comply with supervisory obligations. While the action for annulment
does not provide a remedy in those cases, the action for damages does. This is
indeed the reason why the action of damages has become the main action ensuring
the right to an effective remedy—as examined in particular by Timo Rademacher,
and as analysed with regard to Frontex in particular by Melanie Fink. Finally, EU
public liability law has an attribution function: an action for damages against the
Union would not exclude liability of the host Member State or the other Member
States under the case law following Francovich. Quite to the contrary, EU public
liability law allows to assess each contribution, and the Union and the Member
States can be held jointly liable.
Against this background, one might wonder: If the situation in the EU hotspots is
really so bad, and if EU public liability law really has such potential, why did nobody
file an action for damages against the Union yet? To be sure, the CJEU’s dismissal
of the action for annulment against the EU-Turkey Statement, which was in essence
directed against the implementation of the return policy in the EU Hotspots, does
not preclude an action for damages against the Union based on the systemically
deficient EU hotspot administration: The CJEU’s finding, namely that the Union did
not conclude the EU Turkey Statement, is not relevant to the question of whether the
Union is liable due to its administrative involvement in the EU hotspot administration.
Rather, practical obstacles such as insufficient capacity of legal aid may provide the
reasons: The few lawyers working under extreme pressure in the EU hotspots might
come to the conclusion that it is simply not feasible to invest a considerable amount
of time and resources in a procedure with uncertain outcome.
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4 – The critical question of who is responsible—
holding the Union liable?
Now, assumed that a person succeeded in filing an action against the Union before
the CJEU, and that he or she claimed damages invoking the dire living conditions in
the EU hotspot or his or her deportation to Turkey: Would the Union indeed be held
liable?
Finding an answer to this question requires a close analysis of the extensive
case law on EU public liability law. According to the CJEU’s jurisprudence, non-
contractual liability under Article 340(2) TFEU arises if unlawful conduct of a
Union body, qualifying as a sufficiently serious breach of a rule conferring rights
on individuals, has caused a damage. Liability under Articles 97(4), 98 Frontex
Regulation and respectively Article 45(3) EASO Regulation arises under the same
conditions. Given the scope of this post, the argument here is limited to considering
on the basis of which administrative conduct liability might arise, and shortly outlining
two crucial legal issues.
Frontex could incur liability based on its registration of applicants in the EU hotspots
and based on its escorting of deportations to Turkey. The former contributes,
at least insofar as vulnerable persons are concerned, to keeping applicants in
conditions incompatible with Article 4 ChFR, and the latter, at least in most cases,
to a violation of the non-refoulement principle as enshrined in Articles 4, 18, 19(2)
ChFR. Both could be in breach of Frontex’s obligation to respect fundamental rights
under Articles 1, 36(2), 44(3), 48 Frontex Regulation, Article 51 ChFR. Further, the
conclusion of the relevant Operating Plan, or the omission to withdraw from the
administrative cooperation despite knowledge about systemic fundamental rights
violations could be in breach of Articles 1, 36(2), 46(4) Frontex Regulation, Article 51
ChFR. (On supervisory obligations conferring rights upon individuals see the CJEU’s
case law, notably Ledra.) In the same vein, EASO could incur liability based on its
conducting of asylum interviews, drafting legal opinions, and adopting the relevant
Operating Plan and the Standard Operating Procedures, which could be in breach
of EASO’s obligations to respect fundamental rights. Finally, the Commission could
incur liability based on its failure to adequately exercise its supervisory obligations.
The failure to ensure the implementation of the EU hotspot approach in compliance
with EU law could amount to a breach of Article 40(3) Frontex Regulation, Article
17(1) TEU, Article 51 ChFR. (On administrative omission see the CJEU’s case
law, Kampffmeyer, and more recently Ledra, which confirms that the Commission’s
omission to effectively ensure that Member States act in compliance with EU law
may incur liability.)
To be sure, several legal issues would need to be resolved. Notably, the question
arises to which entity administrative conduct of staff seconded to the EU agencies
must be attributed. To give an example, the question is whether the conduct of
a German officer seconded to Frontex and deployed to Greece as part of an
MMST is to be considered as an act of Germany, of Greece, or of Frontex. Existing
doctrinal analysis mainly suggests attribution to the host Member State due to the
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internal decision-making structure. However, one could also argue that the external
appearance of the conduct towards a reasonable addressee must be taken into
account in addition—which means that the appearance of the seconded staff’s
conduct as conduct of the agency speaks in favour of attribution to the latter. The
CJEU’s decision in A.G.M.-COS.MET as well as the right to a remedy, which cannot
be effectively exercised if the individual is required to analyse the agency’s internal
decision-making structure in order to know against whom to file an action, suggest
such a reading.
Another legal issue arises in the context of causation, namely: whether non-formally
binding administrative conduct may incur liability. The question is whether the
‘sufficiently direct link’ required for causation is ‘broken’ by the administrative
decision of the host Member State. In contrast to its earlier jurisprudence, the CJEU
in KYDEP and similar cases acknowledged that even a telefax by the Commission
may, in principle, incur liability of the Union. It remains to be discussed whether
later case law again overturned the KYDEP doctrine. Another approach, proposed
by Melanie Fink, is to transfer the differentiation between primary and attributed
responsibility, based on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, into EU public
liability law. A further discussion of those issues would go far beyond the scope of
this contribution.
Whether the Union actually is liable for fundamental rights violations in EU hotspots
hence remains to be answered. In other words, the potential of EU public liability
law in the context of EU hotspots remains to be unfolded. And this, to begin with,
requires a closer doctrinal analysis of the CJEU’s case law.
5 – EU public liability law as a limit to externalisation
policies
Current EU migration and asylum policy relies, not fully, but to an important extent,
on externalising the challenge of dealing with enhanced forced migration towards
Europe. The challenge is often either put on third countries, or, where this is not
possible, on Member States located at the EU external border. This approach leads
to large scale fundamental rights violations—despite the difficulties of ECHR and EU
law to address situations characterised by extraterritorialisation and outsourcing.
EU hotspots can be described as a paradigm example in this regard. As
externalisation has an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ effect, it seems possible to
forget about daily fundamental rights violations at the EU’s external borders. EU
constitutional law however calls into question whether mere externalisation to
Member States located at the EU external border is really sufficient to wash the
Union’s and the other Member States’ hands of responsibility. This would indeed
be quite strange, not only in light of the noble values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, but
also given that the European Asylum System is conceived as a Common one.
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